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Abstract
Background: Maintaining adequate supplies of anti-malarial medicines at the health facility level in rural sub-
Saharan Africa is a major barrier to effective management of the disease. Lack of visibility of anti-malarial stock
levels at the health facility level is an important contributor to this problem.
Methods: A 21-week pilot study, ‘SMS for Life’, was undertaken during 2009-2010 in three districts of rural
Tanzania, involving 129 health facilities. Undertaken through a collaborative partnership of public and private
institutions, SMS for Life used mobile telephones, SMS messages and electronic mapping technology to facilitate
provision of comprehensive and accurate stock counts from all health facilities to each district management team
on a weekly basis. The system covered stocks of the four different dosage packs of artemether-lumefantrine (AL)
and quinine injectable.
Results: Stock count data was provided in 95% of cases, on average. A high response rate (≥ 93%) was maintained
throughout the pilot. The error rate for composition of SMS responses averaged 7.5% throughout the study; almost
all errors were corrected and messages re-sent. Data accuracy, based on surveillance visits to health facilities, was
94%. District stock reports were accessed on average once a day. The proportion of health facilities with no stock
of one or more anti-malarial medicine (i.e. any of the four dosages of AL or quinine injectable) fell from 78% at
week 1 to 26% at week 21. In Lindi Rural district, stock-outs were eliminated by week 8 with virtually no stock-outs
thereafter. During the study, AL stocks increased by 64% and quinine stock increased 36% across the three districts.
Conclusions: The SMS for Life pilot provided visibility of anti-malarial stock levels to support more efficient stock
management using simple and widely available SMS technology, via a public-private partnership model that
worked highly effectively. The SMS for Life system has the potential to alleviate restricted availability of anti-malarial
drugs or other medicines in rural or under-resourced areas.
Background
Artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) is
recommended by WHO for first-line treatment for
uncomplicated Plasmodium falciparum malaria [1], in
recognition of the superior efficacy and faster sympto-
matic improvement observed with ACT compared to
other treatments [2,3], as well as a reduction in gameto-
cyte carriage among ACT-treated patients that could
potentially contribute to a lower rate of disease trans-
mission [1,4,5].
Maintaining adequate supplies of ACT at the health
facility level in rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa, how-
ever, can be highly challenging. Poor supply chain man-
agement, including limited or non-existent stock control
and forecasting, means that even though anti-malarial
drugs may be available centrally there can be frequent
stock-outs at the local level, which often last for
extended periods. As a result, patients may have to tra-
vel long distances to obtain ACT or, all too often,
remain untreated with the consequent risk of developing
severe disease, organ damage and death.
Tanzania has the third largest population at risk of
malaria, with 11 million cases of malaria occurring each
year [6]. ACT represents first-line therapy in the
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used to confirm the diagnosis where health facilities
have this resource; otherwise, the diagnosis is made on
the basis of clinical symptoms. Anti-malarial therapies
are distributed via one of two mechanisms in Tanzania.
Products can be issued to health facilities automatically
in fixed quantities on a quarterly basis, with require-
ments determined at district level by the District Medi-
cal Officer (DMO) and at national level by the National
Malaria Control Programme (NMCP) (the ‘push’ sys-
tem). Alternatively, they can be distributed every month
in response to individual requests from health facilities
that are sent by the DMO for approval by the Ministry
of Health, after which medicines are dispatched via an
Integrated Logistics System (ILS) (the ‘pull’ system). In
both cases, medicines are stored and dispatched from
one of nine Zonal Stores in the country.
Recognizing that standardly-available technology has
the potential to improve supply management for anti-
malarial medicines in rural regions, a collaborative part-
nership of public and private institutions was set up
under the auspices of the Roll Back Malaria Partnership
to undertake a 21-week pilot project in Tanzania. The
objective of the project was to improve the supply, plan-
ning and access to ACT therapy through use of mobile
telephones, SMS messages and electronic mapping tech-
nology. The results of this pilot project, ‘SMS for Life’,
are reported here.
Methods
Objectives
The objectives of the SMS for Life pilot were three-fold:
(1) to demonstrate that visibility of weekly stock levels
of key anti-malarial medicines at the health facility level
will promote action to eliminate and/or reduce stock-
outs (2) to demonstrate that a state-of-the-art data gath-
ering infrastructure can be made available via simple
tools such as SMS and mobile telephones in remote
locations in sub-Saharan Africa (3) to demonstrate the
effectiveness of a public-private partnership model.
Location
Of the 131 districts in Tanzania, three rural districts
(Lindi Rural, Ulanga and Kigoma Rural) were selected
by the NMCP for inclusion in the pilot, covering a total
population of 1.2 million. The selected districts met all
four criteria for inclusion. First, the districts were to dif-
fer in terms of level of health service delivery and access,
with the aim of providing a broadly representative sam-
ple of the entire country. Lindi Rural is an ‘average’ dis-
trict. Ulanga is a challenging district in terms of staff
shortages, skill level and remote location. Kigoma Rural
also presents problems, due to its large geographic size
and long distances between the Zonal Store and remote
health facilities. Second, the districts were all to be in
different regions of the country, and supplied by differ-
ent Zonal Stores. Third, all districts were to be malaria
endemic with malaria the most common cause of death.
Fourth, selected districts were not to be involved in
other pilot projects.
Lindi Rural, Ulanga and Kigoma Rural districts
included 48, 30 and 51 health facilities, respectively i.e.
129 health facilities in total. The Lindi Rural and
Kigoma Rural districts operate anti-malarial supply
using a ‘pull’ system via ILS. The Ulanga district is
undergoing a transition from a ‘push’ system to the
‘pull’ system.
Duration and scope of the SMS for Life pilot
The pilot study was 21 weeks in duration. This period
was chosen because it covered two quarterly order cycles
and five monthly delivery cycles. Data collection started
on 1
st October 2009 and ended on 25
th February 2010.
The system covered stocks of artemether-lumefantrine
(AL, Coartem®, Novartis Pharma AG, Basel, Switzerland)
and injectable quinine (provided by multiple manufac-
turers). Stocks of four different dosage packs of AL were
included: ‘yellow’ packs used for babies weighing 5 kg to
< 15 kg, ‘blue’ packs for children weighing 15 kg to < 25
kg, ‘red’ packs for children weighing 25 kg to < 35 kg
and ‘green’ packs for children weighing 35 kg or more
and for adults.
The SMS for Life system
The system consists of two components: an SMS man-
agement tool and a web-based reporting tool.
SMS management tool (Figure 1)
The SMS application stores a single registered mobile
telephone number for one healthcare worker at each
Figure 1 Schematic of the SMS system in the SMS for Life
pilot.
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SMS to each of these telephone numbers. Stock mes-
sages are sent back in reply using a free short code
number at zero cost to the healthcare worker i.e. tele-
phones do not need to be in credit to reply. A standard
message format is used to capture stock quantities of
AL and quinine, and formatting errors are handled
through follow-up SMS messages to the facility.
Step 1 A personal mobile telephone number for one
healthcare worker at each health facility in the three
pilot districts was obtained during training sessions and
registered with the SMS application. Only stock count
messages from registered personal mobile telephone
numbers are accepted.
Step 2 Every Thursday at 14:00 an SMS message is sent
to all registered health facility workers requesting stock
counts.
Step 3 Full boxes of AL in the storeroom of each facility
are counted, and individual quinine injectable vials are
counted in the storeroom and dispensary (the difference
in accounting methodologies was at the request of the
NMCP).
Step 4 An SMS message is composed by the health
facility worker, comprising a code for each type of medi-
cine and the quantity, following an agreed format.
Step 5 The heath facility worker either replies to the
stock request SMS or sends a new SMS using the free
short code number. If the message is sent in an incor-
rect format, the system automatically informs the sen-
der. After three unsuccessful attempts, the district
management is informed and asked to intervene.
Step 6 The SMS system sends an automatic reminder to
all health facilities that have not replied by Friday at
14:00.
Step 7 The SMS system credits the healthcare worker’s
mobile telephone with a fixed amount of money (1000-
1500 TZS, depending on the district) for personal use if
the stock count reply is received before 17:00 on Friday.
Late SMS replies are accepted until 13:00 on the follow-
ing Thursday, but no credit is applied to mobile tele-
phones for late replies.
Step 8 The system provides a weekly status report to
the DMO indicating (a) which health facilities did not
provide a stock count and (b) which health facilities
have a stock-out.
Web-based reporting tool
The data captured from the SMS stock count messages
is made available via a secure website for which access
requires a unique user identification and password.
Access is provided to the DMO and his/her staff in each
participating district, the relevant Regional Medical Offi-
cers and their staff, the project team, the NMCP and
the Medical Stores Department including the Zonal
Stores affiliated with each district. The website provides
(a) current and historical data on AL and quinine inject-
able stock levels at the health facility and district level
(b) Google mapping of district health facilities with
stock levels overlays and stock-out alerts (c) SMS mes-
saging statistics e.g. errors, received messages and (d)
usage statistics.
District-level management
The DMO appointed one person in the district to redis-
tribute medicines in response to stock-outs identified by
the SMS for Life system. Redistribution could be under-
taken by telephoning health facilities with stock-outs to
inform them of excess stock in a neighboring health
facility, or by contacting the Malarial Focal Person in
the district to request that they move stock from a
health facility with a high stock level to a neighboring
facility.
Participant training
Training was provided at three levels:
(i) At a national level, core project and system training
was provided at a half-day session for NMCP, Medical
Stores Department and additional staff to explain the
project objectives, use of the reporting system and
action to be taken based on stock count information
provided.
(ii) At the district level, a half-day training session was
provided for the DMO, Malaria Focal Person, District
Pharmacist and Zonal Store representative for each dis-
trict. Training covered use of the reporting system,
action to be taken based on stock count information
provided, and education and assistance for health facility
workers.
(iii) At the health facility level, a half-day training ses-
sion was provided by the NMCP in-country project lead
for health facility workers within each district, in the
local language. The session included registration of per-
sonal mobile telephone numbers, the procedure for
counting stock, composition of the SMS stock count
messages, live simulations of counting, composing and
sending SMS messages, and best practice for stock man-
agement and storage of anti-malarials.
Monitoring and evaluation
Weekly stock reports, stock-out statistics, error rates,
deliveries and system access were monitored daily online
during the 21-week pilot study. Surveillance visits were
undertaken for 116/129 health facilities (90.0%) at least
once to validate the accuracy of stock count data pro-
vided by health facility workers.
District management team members were interviewed
towards the end of the pilot study to assess stock move-
ment during the study, obtain feedback on use and ease
of access to the data system and on use of the
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mobile telephone numbers, seek views on training and
training materials, and elicit opinions on the SMS for
Life project versus other stock management practices
and the potential for future implementation of the
scheme. Throughout the project, information on every
order and delivery of AL or quinine injectable from
Zonal Stores was collected.
Project partnership and contributions
The project partnership had a fixed-term commitment of
less than one year, with no centralized budget, formal con-
tract or memorandum of understanding. The Tanzanian
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, The Roll Back
Malaria Partnership, Novartis Pharma AG, Vodafone and
IBM took part in the pilot project. Each partner funded
their own activities.
The NMCP in Tanzania, operating as part of the Min-
istry of Health and Social Welfare, was the owner and
main user of the SMS for Life pilot and coordinated all
project activities in the country i.e. planning, implemen-
tation and evaluation, including provision of a project
leader and vehicles with drivers. The Roll Back Malaria
Partnership provided project oversight, including the
work of the steering committee, and led advocacy activ-
ities. Novartis initiated and led the pilot, defining the
solution, sourcing partners, establishing the steering
committee, and providing the necessary resources and
funding (e.g. to support health professional training).
Vodafone and its partner, Matssoft, supported the
design, funding and development of the system applica-
tion and the implementation of the technical solution,
and funded all technical operational costs of the pilot.
IBM supplied management resource support to the pro-
ject and provided an on-line collaboration tool ‘Lotus
Live’, which allowed all the project partners to coordi-
nate their inputs across company networks.
Results
Data collection
During the 21-week study, the average response rate to
SMS requests for stock count data was 95%. The
response rate did not fall below 93% at any point (Figure
2). The proportion of late replies (i.e. after 17:00 on Fri-
day) was low, averaging 3% overall. The rate of
responses, and the proportion of late responses, did not
vary markedly during the pilot, other than after the
request sent on 14
th January 2010 when there was a
national problem with connectivity on one mobile tele-
p h o n en e t w o r k( F i g u r e2 ) .T h eh i g h e s tr e s p o n s er a t e
was in Lindi Rural (99%), compared to 93% in Ulanga
and 94% in Kigoma Rural, which is likely to have been
the result of disciplinary action in the Lindi Rural dis-
trict, consisting of warning letters and interviews at the
district office for non-compliant health facility staff.
Across all three districts, feedback from district manage-
ment and data from questionnaires completed by health
facility workers indicated that the financial incentive of
airtime credit was an important contributor to the high
response rate.
The error rate for composition of SMS responses was
low, averaging 7.5% throughout the study (Figure 2). In
Lindi Rural, 100% of error SMS responses were cor-
rected, and although data on corrected rate were not
routinely collected the fact that the accepted response
rate did not fall below 93% at any point confirms that
even incorrect messages from the other two districts
were usually corrected.
Stock counting, as assessed by surveillance visits to
116 of the 129 health facilities in the three districts,
showed a data accuracy of 94% i.e. the most recent
stock message matched the inventory inspected at the
health facility.
System usage
The central NMCP log-in was activated on average once
a day. The central Medical Stores Department and the
Zonal Stores in the three districts virtually never
accessed the system. At the district level, the weekly
emails sent by the SMS for Life system were read by at
least one team member in the district management
team of each district every week during the pilot, with
the exception of a single email to the Kigoma team. Sys-
tem usage in the Lindi Rural district decreased as stock-
outs were eliminated after week 8, declining from 45
log-ins during October 2009 to 13 log-ins during Febru-
ary 2010. In Ulanga, log-ins increased (35 log-ins during
October-December, rising to 70 log-ins during the last 6
weeks of the project) after the Clinical Officer in the
District Medical Office was given a Blackberry and more
Figure 2 Proportion of health facilities responding to SMS
requests for stock counts according to timing of response, and
error rate in responses, during the 21-week SMS for Life pilot.
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In the third district, Kigoma Rural, access to the system
was low in the early phase (33 times in October-Decem-
ber) but increased to 28 times in the last 6 weeks after
the District Pharmacist and Malaria Focal Person were
each given a Blackberrry device to access stock count
data.
Anti-malarial stock levels
At the start of the pilot (week 1), 78% of health facilities
had no stock of one or more of the four different AL
dosage packs or of quinine injectable. By the end of the
pilot (week 21), this proportion had fallen to 26%. The
reduction in stock-outs was largely related to improve-
ments in stocks of AL, since the proportion of health
facilities with stock-outs of quinine at the start of the
study was lower (18% compared to 77% of facilities with
a stock-out of AL) (Figure 3). Stock-outs of all dosages
of AL showed a progressive decline over the first two
months of the pilot, with a gradual increase from the
middle of December to the second half of January,
reflecting the ILS delivery schedule. By the end of the
pilot, stocks-out of AL blue, green and yellow were
almost eradicated but a fifth of health facilities still had
no AL red, almost entirely due to continuing stock-outs
in the Kigoma Rural district (Figure 4a). Over 80% of
facilities held stocks of quinine injectable at baseline,
which increased to more than 95% by the end of the
pilot (Figure 4b).
Over the same period, total AL stock across the three
districts increased by 64% from 2,696 boxes at week 1
to 4,411 boxes at week 21, while the number of quinine
vials increased by 36% from 12,536 to 16,981 (36%).
Stock levels showed a small increase for all AL dosages
by week 21, with similar levels of AL blue, green and
yellow, but stocks of AL red remained lower than for
other dosages, again primari l yd u et ot h eK i g o m aR u r a l
district (Figure 5a). Quinine injectable stock levels also
showed a small increase during the pilot (Figure 5b).
There were marked differences between the three dis-
tricts in terms of achievement of full stocking and in
stock levels, for a variety of reasons. The Lindi Rural
district was the most successful in managing stock
levels, eliminating stock-outs for all five categories of
medicine by week 8 and maintaining stocks of all three
anti-malarials at almost all health facilities thereafter.
Two key factors contributed. First, after receiving the
first set of stock count data, the district management
team made an emergency order to the Zonal Store. This
delivery was distributed to health facilities according to
priority based on their urgency of demand during weeks
2, 3 and 4, thereby eradicating most stock-outs. Second,
when a health facility reported having only one box of
any AL dosage pack, the district pharmacist either
issued further stock or moved stock from a neighboring
health facility in a pre-emptive manner. In the Ulanga
district, the rate of stock-outs at week 1 was high (87%
of health facilities), largely because no blue dosage packs
of AL had been delivered to the district for almost a
year. Also, Ulanga was transitioning from the ‘push’ sys-
tem to ILS delivery during the pilot. As a result, deliv-
eries were delayed and there were discrepancies between
stock orders and the item delivered, for example with
no blue AL dosage packs included and only very small
quantities of other AL dosages. Furthermore, an emer-
gency delivery was not received. Following two ILS
deliveries, the second of which included blue AL dosage
packs, 78% of all health facilities in Ulanga became fully
stocked by week 21. The proportion of health facilities
with no quinine injectable, however, increased from 3%
at week 1 to 7% at week 21. In the third district, Kigoma
Rural, almost all health facilities (93%) had a stock-out
of at least one type of anti-malarial at week 1, and 36%
were out of stock of all five products. There was an
Figure 3 Proportion of health facilities with stock-out of (a) 1 type of dosage pack of artemether-lumefantrine (AL) or (b) quinine
injectable at the start (week 1) or end (week 21) of the SMS for Life pilot overall and by district.
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of January 2010, with 42% of health facilities still having
no red packs at the end of the study. Over 90% of health
facilities, however, had stocks of all other products by
week 21. The district relied only on regular ILS deliveries.
Following the two ILS deliveries that were received dur-
ing the pilot, the district management took 3-4 weeks to
distribute medicines from the first delivery to all health
facilities and after delivery of a complete ILS order in late
December, including red AL dosage packs, stock counts
of red packs only rose from 21 January onwards. Several
factors contributed to outcomes in the Kigoma Rural dis-
trict. The ILS delivery quantity for red dosage packs of
AL was only sufficient to prevent stock-outs for three
weeks, such that stock-outs were inevitable. Second,
when red dosage packs were delivered they were distribu-
ted unevenly between health facilities, with some facilities
receiving none, and no active redistribution was underta-
ken subsequently. Lastly, no emergency orders were sub-
mitted from the Kigoma Rural district despite severe
stock shortages for the majority of the pilot.
Discussion
The SMS for Life pilot achieved all three of its objec-
tives. First, visibility of anti-malarial stock levels at the
health facility level supported more efficient stock man-
agement. Across all three districts, the proportion of
health facilities fully stocked with all five anti-malarial
products increased from approximately one quarter to
three quarters over the 21-week pilot. Second, the SMS
for Life system brought accurate stock level information
to all relevant parties using simple and widely available
SMS technology that was easily accessed by appropriate
users. Thirdly, the public-private partnership model
Figure 4 Proportion of health facilities with stock-out of (a) each dosage pack of artemether-lumefantrine and (b) vials of quinine
injectable during the SMS for Life pilot. Combined data from all three districts are shown.
Figure 5 Stock counts for (a) boxes of each dosage pack of artemether-lumefantrine and (b) vials of quinine injectable during the
SMS for Life pilot. Combined data from all three districts are shown.
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tributor to the success of the project.
To achieve full stocking of all five anti-malarial pro-
ducts required both an adequate starting level of pro-
ducts across the district and proactive redistribution of
products by district management between health facil-
ities. Redistribution is always likely to be required to
compensate for delivery of varying quantities to different
health facilities and varying consumption rates, particu-
larly when there is a shortage of stock. By providing visi-
bility of stock levels, the SMS for Life system meant that
both of these criteria could be met, as demonstrated in
the Lindi Rural district where health facilities were vir-
tually all fully stocked after week 8 of the pilot. Compre-
hensive stock information was provided from health
facilities, with an average response rate of 95%. Stock
level information was accessible even in the remotest
areas, and was provided via both weekly emails and
secure web-based data to maximize usage. All aspects of
the system proved easy to use after only a short training
session. It was important to track log-ins by district staff
and intervene as necessary by offering further training or
additional access solutions (e.g. provision of Blackberry
devices or computer modems); such interventions
prompted dramatic increases in log-in rates in both the
Ulanga and Kigoma Rural districts. By tracking weekly
usage of all malaria products (ACTs, quinine and RCTs if
used) by individual health facility, the system can profile
annual requirements by facility, to inform and improve
the accuracy of ordering and supply chain efficiency.
From weekly usage of RDT’sa n dA C T ’s the system can
also calculate a proxy for the number of positive versus
negative tests. While expiry dates were not tracked, a sig-
nificant finding was that weekly visibility by facility led to
DMOs being extremely active in implementing ongoing
re-distribution of stock between facilities, thus reducing
the risk of stock going out of date.
The pilot was implemented through a novel public-
private partnership under the umbrella of the Roll Back
Malaria Partnership. The SMS for Life solution was
designed, built and implemented in less than a year,
with no formal budget or legal contracts between part-
ners. With a short timeframe and no ongoing financial
commitments, this model was appealing to potential
commercial partners, without whom the pilot could not
have been undertaken.
A number of critical success factors were identified
(Table 1). Government commitment at a high level is
essential to ensure the system is workable and sustain-
able, and that its use is mandatory. Mobile telephone
coverage within an acceptable distance (maximum 2-3
hours’ walk from the health facility, although a period of
no more than 15-30 minutes would be ideal) is a neces-
sary prerequisite to participation. It is also crucial for
health workers to use their personal mobile telephones,
with which they are familiar and for which maintenance
is not the responsibility of the project. Accordingly, a
free number for sending stock information is mandatory
since messages can still be sent if the telephone has no
credit, a situation that can arise frequently. Although
the pilot did not include a control arm without a finan-
cial incentive, feedback from health workers, district
management and the NMCP indicated that a credit
incentive for timely responses was key to the high
response rates observed. The training sessions for health
care workers was essential, and learning points from
this pilot include notifying delegates in advance to bring
a personal mobile telephone; a practical session on how
to send SMS text messages; and expanding the live sce-
nario workshop component.
Other uses of cell phones and SMS texts to improve
health care delivery have previously been explored in
resource-constrained settings in Africa [7-10]. These
have typically focused on improving patient adherence
to treatment for HIV/AIDS or tuberculosis, and enhan-
cing communication between healthcare workers and
remotely-located patients [7-9]. One innovative pilot
study in Zambia has used weekly SMS reports of new
cases of malaria from rural health centers to provide
punctual detection of positive diagnoses and thus facili-
tate timely intervention to prevent an upsurge in trans-
mission [10]. Such approaches have proved technically
feasible and achieved good outcomes, such that mobile
phone-based systems appear likely to expand as part of
rural health care provision in Africa. The current study,
which to our knowledge is the first to apply an SMS-
centered system to manage stock levels at a local level,
has demonstrated another practical and successful appli-
cation of the technology. As use of RDTs expands in
Tanzania, ACT stock levels would be reduced accord-
ingly and tight management of stocking would become
even more critical to avoid stockouts. The current sys-
tem would then become even more valuable - and addi-
tionally offer weekly monitoring of RDTs supplies to
avoid reversion to clinically-based diagnosis for which
ACT stocks then be inadequate to treat.
In conclusion, this innovative pilot shows that the
SMS for Life system has the potential to alleviate
restricted anti-malarial drug availability in rural areas,
one of the major barriers to effective management of
the disease. The system is flexible, scalable and compati-
ble with any mobile telephone network, and can be
implemented in any country with minimal tailoring.
Costs for implementing the system on a wider scale
would be low, at approximately US$5,000 per district in
Tanzania, with the largest single item being the per
diem payment to health facility staff to attend training
sessions. Ongoing post-implementation costs would be
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weekly incentive payments. The system could also use-
fully be applied to stock management of other priority
medicines in similar settings. Finally, the public-private
partnership model piloted here effectively harnessed a
series of diverse skills and expertise and could be uti-
lized to tackle other societal problems.
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Table 1 Critical success factors for SMS for Life project implementation
Factor Comments
Inclusion in government mainstream
programmes
Ensures that the system becomes mandatory and included in job descriptions/accountability of district
personnel
Project tasks are not dependent on external resources
Fixed timescale A specific time period for implementation is advisable
A period of 12-18 months is recommended
Strict timelines and strong project management are essential
Mobile telephone coverage Mobile telephone coverage within at least 2-3 hours of the health facility is mandatory for project
participation
Future implementation should be focused on areas with adequate coverage
Free mobile telephone response number Personal telephones frequently have no credit Free number ensures that cost is not a deterrent to
sending stock count replies
Use of personal mobile telephones Avoids problems of maintenance, familiarity and issue of ownership associated with project-owned
telephones
Registration/deregistration permits changes to health facility staff and personal mobile telephone
numbers
Airtime credit incentive for punctual stock
count responses
Transmit a small amount of airtime credit to personal mobile telephones for each timely response
(recommended for at least a one-year period)
Mobile telephone access to the system Provide a mobile telephone version of the system, and Blackberry or similar devices if necessary, to
permit management staff to connect to the system if computer-based access is problematic
Effective training session for health facility
workers
Invitations to stress the importance of bringing a personal mobile telephone with known network
coverage in the health facility area
Include session on ‘how to text’
Expand practical component to run 5 live scenarios twice
Improved health facility store rooms Pharmacy best practice would be assisted by standardized provision of store room equipment/shelving
Include stock counts at Zonal Stores Weekly stock counts from Zonal Stores would provide comprehensive visibility of stock levels and stock
coverage for the entire country
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